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Book Note
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, by Ernest J Weinrib1
ANTHONY R SANGIULIANO
AS THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA has recently proclaimed,2 the philosophical 
idea of corrective justice constitutes private law’s indigenous normative structure, 
and it guides judges’ practical reasoning when they adjudicate disputes over 
interpersonal liability. It is a venerable idea, fi rst articulated by Aristotle3 and 
later elaborated by Immanuel Kant4 and G.W.F. Hegel.5 
Ernest Weinrib’s methodological articulation of the meaning and content 
of corrective justice in Th e Idea of Private Law6 has strongly infl uenced the 
development of private law theory, particularly tort law theory.7 In his new 
book, Weinrib displays the rich theoretical resources that corrective justice off ers 
for theorizing about matters of recent legal and academic debate. Th e book is not 
limited to the horizon of tort law, exploring other private law causes of action and 
selected topics in public law.
1.  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 343 pages.
2.  See Clements v Clements, 2012 SCC 32, [2012] 2 SCR 181 at para 7.
3.  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed, translated by Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) at 87-88 [Book V, ch 4, 1132a-b].
4.  Immanuel Kant, Th e Metaphysics of Morals, ed, translated by Mary Gregor, in Th e Works of 
Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 353 at 
401-52 [6:245-6:308].
5.  GWF Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed Allen W Wood, translated by HB Nesbit 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 67-72 [§§ 34-40].
6.  (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1995).
7.  See e.g. Arthur Ripstein, “Editor’s Note” (2011) 61:2 UTLJ i; Bruce Chapman, “Ernie’s 
Th ree Worlds” (2011) 61:2 UTLJ 179; John Gardner, “What is Tort Law For? Part 1. Th e 
Place of Corrective Justice” (2011) 30:1 L & Phil 1 at 1-6. Weinrib’s work has, of course, 
not been without its detractors. See e.g. Allan C Hutchinson, “Th e Importance of not Being 
Ernest” (1989) 34:2 McGill LJ 233. 
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In chapter one, Weinrib explains that corrective justice is the ideal that 
underpins all private law claims by a plaintiff  against a defendant. It is a juridical 
ideal; it abstracts the distinctive normative structure intrinsic to the plaintiff -
defendant relationship from its unifi cation under private law. Weinrib thus 
opposes those who treat private law as an instrument for attaining social 
goals—such as economic effi  ciency—the desirability of which is extrinsic to 
the plaintiff -defendant relationship. 
According to the juridical conception of corrective justice, private law regards 
the parties to a lawsuit as active and passive poles of the same injustice. Th e injustice 
consists in a disruption of the parties’ equality, whereby each party has what is 
rightfully his or hers. It is rectifi ed when a remedy corrects the plaintiff ’s defi ciency 
by depleting the defendant’s excess. Th e correlativity in the plaintiff -defendant 
relationship entails that each party’s normative situation is relevant only in 
relation to that of the other. Hence, for the parties to be treated fairly by a 
judge, practical reasons unilaterally applicable to only one party—such as its deep 
pockets or insurability against loss—are irrelevant.
In chapter two, Weinrib shows that corrective justice clarifi es the “general 
conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care” outlined by Lord Atkin in 
Donoghue v Stevenson8 and that the landmark tort cases disclose judicial attempts 
to articulate this ideal. He argues that the Supreme Court of Canada’s9 current 
approach to the concept of a duty of care disintegrates Lord Atkin’s “general 
conception” by introducing policy considerations into the analysis that either 
apply unilaterally to plaintiff  or defendant or advance a value that is external to the 
plaintiff -defendant relationship. Chapter three is about remedies. Weinrib argues 
that private law injustices should be understood as normative reasons for remedies, 
rather than as causative events of which remedies are consequences. Chapter four 
extends this argument to restitutionary remedies for gain-based damages.
In chapter fi ve, Weinrib distinguishes between in rem rights and in personam 
rights to defend the proposition, famously repudiated by Fuller and Perdue,10 
that the standard measure of damages for contractual breach is the expectation 
measure. He also criticizes the Court’s recent approval of punitive damage awards 
for contractual breach.11 Th e reasoning that informs such awards is defi cient because 
it incorporates considerations unilaterally applicable to the defendant, i.e., the 
8.  [1932] AC 563 (HL) at 580.
9.  See Cooper v Hobart, 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 SCR 357. 
10.  LL Fuller & William R Perdue Jr, “Th e Reliance Interest in Contract Damages” (1937) 46:1 
Yale LJ 1. 
11.  See Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co, 2002 SCC 18, [2002] 1 SCR 595.
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social disapproval of the defendant’s conduct, rather than considerations that 
embrace the parties’ relationship as a whole. In chapter six, Weinrib advances a 
novel theory of unjust enrichment, a dynamic area of private law that has recently 
attracted scholars’ sustained attention.12
Th e fi nal chapters show how corrective justice applies to areas other than 
private law. Chapter seven discusses the doctrine of unrequested improvements 
in Jewish law. Chapter eight defends a Kantian approach to property law and 
redistributive taxation. Chapter nine explores the disjunction in modern legal 
education between the study of law as a practical enterprise in support of the 
legal profession and the study of law as an academic enterprise based on the 
model of university education.
While Weinrib’s writing exhibits the rigour of philosophical inquiry, it is also 
notable for the imagery it invokes; he uses helpful spatial metaphors to illustrate 
how the elements of the plaintiff -defendant relationship interlock through law 
to form a symmetrical, integrated unit. His book is a sterling example of how 
philosophical argumentation can be eff ectively combined with doctrinal analysis. 
It thus has an audience in philosophers and lawyers alike.
12.  See e.g. Jennifer M Nadler, “What Right Does Unjust Enrichment Law Protect?” (2008) 
28:2 Oxford J Legal Stud 245; Zoë Sinel, “Th rough Th ick and Th in: Th e Place of Corrective 
Justice in Unjust Enrichment” (2011) 31:3 Oxford J Legal Stud 551.
